Conceptual Disagreement

American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):15-28 (2019)
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Abstract

Can you disagree with someone without thinking that what they say is false? As we shall see, this is not only possible but quite frequent. Starting with the type of disagreement most familiar from the philosophical literature, we will progressively expand the circle of genuine disagreement until it encompasses even conceptual disagreement, which might sound like a contradiction in terms. For conceptual disagreement necessarily involves the parties' using different concepts, which one might think would preclude genuine disagreement. We shall argue otherwise, adducing three different types of case in order to demonstrate the scope of this phenomenon.

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Author's Profile

Sarah Stroud
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Epistemic injustice and deepened disagreement.T. J. Lagewaard - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1571-1592.
Conceptual Exploration.Rachel Etta Rudolph - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Disagreement as Interpersonal Incoherence.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):245-268.

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References found in this work

Conceptual Ethics I.Alexis Burgess & David Plunkett - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1091-1101.
Epistemic partiality in friendship.Sarah Stroud - 2006 - Ethics 116 (3):498-524.
Conceptual Ethics I.David Plunkett Alexis Burgess - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1091-1101.
The nature of ethical disagreement.Charles L. Stevenson - 2000 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press USA.

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