Errors about errors: Virtue theory and trait attribution

Mind 111 (441):47-68 (2002)
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Abstract

This paper examines the implications of certain social psychological experiments for moral theory—specifically, for virtue theory. Gilbert Harman and John Doris have recently argued that the empirical evidence offered by ‘situationism’ demonstrates that there is no such thing as a character trait. I dispute this conclusion. My discussion focuses on the proper interpretation of the experimental data—the data themselves I grant for the sake of argument. I develop three criticisms of the anti-trait position. Of these, the central criticism concerns three respects in which the experimental situations employed to test someone's character trait are inadequate to the task. First, they do not take account of the subject's own construal of the situation. Second, they include behaviour that is only marginally relevant to the trait in question. Third, they disregard the normative character of the responses in which virtue theory is interested. Given these inadequacies in situationism's operationalized conception of a ‘character trait’, I argue that situationism does not really address the proposition that people have ‘character traits’, properly understood. A fortiori, the social psychological evidence does not refute that proposition. I also adduce some limited experimental evidence in favour of character traits and distil two lessons we can nevertheless learn from situationism.

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Gopal Sreenivasan
Duke University

Citations of this work

Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse & Glen Pettigrove - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Believing For a Reason.John Turri - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.
Agency.Markus Schlosser - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Character and theory of mind: an integrative approach.Evan Westra - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (5):1217-1241.
The Trouble with Tracing.Manuel Vargas - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269-291.

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References found in this work

Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Philosophy 75 (293):454-458.
Précis of Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):122-135.
Made in the shade: Moral compatibilism and the aims of moral theory.Peter Railton - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (sup1):79-106.

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