Reason is normative, and should be studied accordingly

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):267-268 (2011)
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Abstract

Reason aims at truth, so normative considerations are a proper part of the study of reasoning. Excluding them means neglecting some of what we know or can discover about reasoning. Also, the normativist position we are asked to reject by Elqayam & Evans (E&E) is defined in attenuated and self-contradictory ways

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David Spurrett
University of KwaZulu-Natal

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