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Revisionary dispositionalism and practical reason
The Journal of Ethics 4 (3):173-190 (2000)
Abstract
This paper examines the metaphysically modest view that attributionsof normative reasons can be made true in the absence of a responseindependent normative reality. The paper despairs in finding asatisfactory account of normative reasons in metaphysically modestterms.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Debunking morality: Evolutionary naturalism and moral error theory.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (4):567-581.
Misinformation, subjectivism, and the rational criticizability of desire.Jay Jian - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):845-866.
Moral realism, normative reasons, and rational intelligibility.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (1):47-69.
References found in this work
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
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