Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):49-57 (2015)

Thomas H. Smith
University of Manchester
I compare Bratman’s theory with Gilbert’s. I draw attention to their similarities, query Bratman’s claim that his theory is the more parsimonious, and point to one theoretical advantage of Gilbert’s theory.
Keywords Michael Bratman  Margaret Gilbert  Shared agency  Shared intention  Joint commitment
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DOI 10.1515/jso-2014-0045
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References found in this work BETA

Rationality in Collective Action.Margaret Gilbert - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):3-17.

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Citations of this work BETA

Deconstructing Searle’s Making the Social World.Frank Hindriks - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (3):363-369.

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Framing Joint Action.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):173-192.
Shared Intention and Personal Intentions.Margaret Gilbert - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):167 - 187.
Shared Emotions.Mikko Salmela - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):33-46.
Shared Agency.Michael Bratman - 2009 - In Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice. Cambridge University Press. pp. 41--59.


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