A Defence of Epistemic Consequentialism

Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):541-551 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Epistemic consequentialists maintain that the epistemically right (e.g., the justified) is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to the epistemic good (e.g., true belief). Given the wide variety of epistemological approaches that assume some form of epistemic consequentialism, and the controversies surrounding consequentialism in ethics, it is surprising that epistemic consequentialism remains largely uncontested. However, in a recent paper, Selim Berker has provided arguments that allegedly lead to a ‘rejection’ of epistemic consequentialism. In the present paper, it is shown that reliabilism—the most prominent form of epistemic consequentialism, and one of Berker’s main targets—survives Berker’s arguments unscathed

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,346

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-06-12

Downloads
240 (#51,997)

6 months
4 (#184,255)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Jeff Dunn
DePauw University

Citations of this work

Vice Epistemology.Quassim Cassam - 2016 - The Monist 99 (2):159-180.
An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.
Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.

View all 36 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references