Abstract

The legislative answers to a growing fear of crime or other (e.g. environmental) problems are quite often so-called „symbolic statutes“ which have little or no effect on the level of crime or the solution of the respective problem but are meant to calm down the people. Obviously, these laws are in contradiction to the claim of rationality inherent in the idea of self-government of the autonomous subject and the very idea of law as it has been developed by the philosophy of Enlightenment, and especially by Imanuel Kant. This article analyses different forms and manifestations of objectivity and rationality as well as different understandings of „symbols“ and their relationship with law and the process of law-making. It deals with the tension between the rationalist idea of law and the dynamics of the democratic process in political issues. These considerations lead to the choice between more „élitist“ or more „democratic“ readings of the principle of representation. Supporting the latter, the article holds that the Constitution itself strikes the right balance, leaving - within certain limits - a broad margin of discretion to the representative body of the people. However, it is the responsibility of each of its members to guard these constitutional limits and, if necessary, to vote against symbolic statutes which, at least in their sum, could undermine the idea of law.