Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (
2024)
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Abstract
"Stoic erôs" sounds like a contradiction in terms. The ancient Stoics are notorious for their claim that the ideal human life is free of passion. So when it comes to arguably the most passionate emotion of all, we might expect them to take a uniformly dim view. Just like anger, fear, grief, and the other passions censured by Stoic theory, erotic love would seem to have no place in the best human life.
In fact the Stoics distinguish two forms of erôs. In vicious agents erôs is indeed a passion and thus born out of a defective rational judgment about what is needed for happiness. But there is also a positive form of erotic love, practiced by the Sage on the basis of knowledge, which aims to reproduce his virtuous condition in others. I show how the Stoics' wider theoretical commitments in ethics, epistemology, aesthetics, and psychology support their duplex account of erôs. I also consider the influence of Plato's Symposium on the Stoic account, arguing for hitherto unrecognized links with Socratic moral psychology. I conclude with an assessment of how the Stoic erotic ideal fares in relation to our intuitions about the non-egoistic and particularized nature of love.