Incline and Admonish

Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 57 (2):20-32 (2020)
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Abstract

The article deals with the forms of epistemic injustice associated with the scentization of expertise, its locking in a separate scientific discipline. Counter-expertise is directed against deprivation of the right to speak out about one's own interests which is the most common form of epistemic injustice. But the most radical form is related to the comprehension of other’s phenomenal experience as a derivative of the parameters measured by expert. In this regard, the concept of embodiment can play a crucial role both in preventing epistemic injustice and in overcoming the crisis of expertise.

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