Philosophical Studies 146 (2):269 - 272 (2008)
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Abstract |
The knowledge account of assertion—roughly: one should not assert what one does not know—aspires to identify the norm distinctive of assertion. One main argument given in support of the knowledge account has been the success with which it explains a variety of Moore-paradoxical assertion. But that explanation does not generalize satisfactorily.
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Keywords | Norms of assertion Knowledge account Moore’s paradox |
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Reprint years | 2009 |
DOI | 10.1007/s11098-008-9255-8 |
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.
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