Synthese 199 (5-6):14667-14690 (2021)

Authors
Christopher Willard-Kyle
University of Glasgow
Abstract
Unlike first-person Moorean sentences, it’s not always awkward to assert, “p, but you don’t know that p.” This can seem puzzling: after all, one can never get one’s audience to know the asserted content by speaking thus. Nevertheless, such assertions can be conversationally useful, for instance, by helping speaker and addressee agree on where to disagree. I will argue that such assertions also make trouble for the growing family of views about the norm of assertion that what licenses proper assertion is not the initiating epistemic position of the speaker but the resulting epistemic position of the audience.
Keywords Moorean paradoxes  Norms of Assertion  Unknowable Assertions
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-021-03438-4
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Oxford University Press.
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.

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Citations of this work BETA

Being in a Position to Know is the Norm of Assertion.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):328-352.

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