Ethics as philosophy : A defense of ethical nonnaturalism

In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK (2006)
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Russ Shafer-Landau
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Citations of this work

Moral disagreement and moral skepticism.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):302-333.
How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.
Anti-Realist Pluralism: a New Approach to Folk Metaethics.Thomas Pölzler & Jennifer Cole Wright - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):53-82.

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