Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience

In Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol 7. pp. 205 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX


It is widely accepted that the ethical supervenes on the natural, where this is roughly the claim that it is impossible for two circumstances to be identical in all natural respects, but different in their ethical respects. This chapter refines and defends the traditional thought that this fact poses a significant challenge to ethical non-naturalism, a view on which ethical properties are fundamentally different in kind from natural properties. The challenge can be encapsulated in three core claims which the chapter defends: that a defensible non-naturalism is committed to the supervenience of the ethical, that this commits the non-naturalist to a brute necessary connection between properties of distinct kinds, and that commitment to such brute connections counts against the non-naturalist’s view. Each of these claims has recently been challenged. Against Nicholas Sturgeon’s recent doubts about the dialectical force of supervenience, this chapter defends a supervenience thesis as deserving to be common ground among ethical realists. It is then argued that attempts to explain supervenience on behalf of the non-naturalist either fail as explanations, generate near-identical explanatory burdens elsewhere, or appeal to commitments that are inconsistent with core motivations for non-naturalism. The chapter concludes that, suitably refined, the traditional argument against nonnaturalism from supervenience is alive and well.



External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Yes to realism! No to nonnaturalism! Ulysses - 2009 - Kritike 3 (1):168-177.
Moral discourse and descriptive properties.Brad Majors - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):475–494.
Physicalism and Moorean Supervenience.Thomas W. Polger - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):72-92.
Why naturalism?David Copp - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):179-200.
Anti-reductionism and supervenience.Michael Ridge - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):330-348.
Realism, Nominalism, and Biological Naturalism.James D. Madden - 2011 - International Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):85-102.
Replies to papers.Terry Horgan - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):302-340.
Nonreductive Ethical Naturalism.Andrew B. Schoedinger - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 1:3-6.


Added to PP

4,319 (#1,317)

6 months
247 (#8,967)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Tristram McPherson
Ohio State University

Citations of this work

Against Grounding Necessitarianism.Alexander Skiles - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (4):717-751.
Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
What is (In)coherence?Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:184-206.
Ground by Law.Gideon Rosen - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):279-301.
The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15.

View all 36 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 55 references / Add more references