The first handbook on the topic of religious epistemology introduces and discusses topics fundamental to the epistemology of religious belief.

In this paper I lay out, argue for, and defend ethical Mooreanism. In essence, the view says that some moral propositions are Moorean propositions and thus are epistemically superior to the conjunctions of the premises of skeptical arguments to the contrary. In Sect. 1 I explain Mooreanism and then ethical Mooreanism. In Sect. 2 I argue for ethical Mooreanism by noting a number of important epistemic parities that hold between certain moral truths and standard Moorean facts. In Sect. 3 I (...) defend ethical Mooreanism against the objection that moral propositions are too epistemically dissimilar to standard Moorean facts to count as Moorean truths. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to get clear on how we should think about Mooreanism. I will argue that Mooreanism is best understood as a metaphilosophical response to skepticism rather than a particular position on specialized debates in first-order epistemology. This ecumenical understanding of Mooreanism implies that a broad array of epistemologists is free to be Moorean. In Sect. 2 I discuss several non-Moorean responses to skepticism. In Sect. 3 I provide an exposition of Mooreanism itself. In Sect. 4 (...) I show that most epistemologists are free to be Mooreans. This is important for the following reason: to the extent that we want a non-concessive reply to the skeptic – rather than a reply that is partially or potentially concessive – we should be highly attracted to Mooreanism. (shrink)

In this paper I will apply the Moorean response to external world skepticism to moral skepticism, specifically to the evolutionary debunking argument against morality. I begin, in section 1, with a discussion of Mooreanism. In section 2, I proceed to a discussion of metaethical Mooreanism, which is the view that some moral facts are Moorean facts. In section 3 I apply metaethical Mooreanism to the evolutionary debunking argument against morality. If the arguments of the paper hold up it will turn (...) out that it is no more rational to abandon the existence of moral facts than it is to deny that one knows that one has hands. (shrink)

Philosophers explain the reasons that persuaded them to become Catholic.

One common way of attacking dogmatism is to attack its alleged Mooreanism. The thought is that dogmatism includes (or perhaps entails) Mooreanism, but that Mooreanism is false and thus so is dogmatism. One way of responding to this charge is to defend Mooreanism. Another strategy is to articulate a version of dogmatism without Mooreanism. This paper is an attempt to articulate the latter view.

The epistemic value problem—that of explaining why knowledge is valuable, and in particular why it is more valuable than lesser epistemic standings, such as true belief—remains unsolved. Here, I argue that this problem can be solved by combining proper functionalism about knowledge with perfectionism about goodness. I begin by laying out the epistemic value problem and the extant challenges to solving it. I then proceed to begin solving the problem by explicating a broad and ecumenical form of proper functionalism. I (...) finish solving the problem by introducing the perfectionist theory of value and then showing how that theory of goodness, in tandem with proper functionalism, solves the epistemic value problem. (shrink)

This volume provides a contemporary account of classical theism. It features sixteen original essays from leading scholars that advance the discussion of classical theism in new and interesting directions. It's safe to say that classical theism--the view that God is simple, omniscient, and the greatest possible being--is no longer the assumed view in analytic philosophy of religion. It is often dismissed as being rooted in outdated metaphysical systems of the sort advanced by ancient and medieval philosophers. The main purpose of (...) this volume is twofold: to provide a contemporary account of what classical theism is and to advance the scholarly discussion about classical theism. In Section I, the contributors offer a clear and cutting-edge account of the nature and existence of the God and the historical and theological foundations of classical theism. Section II contains chapters on a variety of topics, such as whether classical theism's doctrine of simplicity needs revision, whether simplicity is compatible with the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, and whether the hypothesis of a multiplicity of divine ideas is consistent with divine simplicity, among others. Classical Theism will appeal to scholars and advanced students in philosophy of religion who are interested in the nature of God. (shrink)

What we here show is two-fold. First, there is in certain sectors of the legal community a trend to pronounce negatively on the epistemic credentials of religious belief: many hold that religious belief as such is simply irrational. Our second claim is simply that religious belief need not be irrational: it is perfectly possible for religious believers to have epistemically justified religious beliefs. We discuss here several implications of our two-fold claim. The most important of these is simply that religious (...) citizens’ religious beliefs cannot be barred from the public square for any epistemological reason. (shrink)