Do affective desires provide reasons for action?

Ratio 34 (2):147-157 (2020)
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Abstract

This paper evaluates the claim that some desires provide reasons in virtue of their connection with conscious affective experiences like feelings of attraction or aversion. I clarify the nature of affective desires and several distinct ways in which affective desires might provide reasons. Against accounts proposed by Ruth Chang, Declan Smithies and Jeremy Weiss, I motivate doubts that it is the phenomenology of affective experiences that explains their normative or rational significance. I outline an alternative approach that centralises the function of such experiences.

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Author's Profile

Ashley Shaw
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Attraction, Aversion, and Meaning in Life.Alisabeth Ayars - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.

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