A Tension in the Strong Program: The Relation between the Rational and the Social

Social Epistemology 36 (2):194-204 (2022)
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Abstract

Advocating a sociological explanation of scientific knowledge, David Bloor protests against the adherents of the autonomy of knowledge; i.e., those who asymmetrically explain the credibility of theories in the history of science. These philosophers and historians regard the credibility of true and rational theories due to their proper reasons, while accounting for the acceptance of false or irrational beliefs by citing social causes. Bloor assumes that the credibility of all beliefs is socially influenced, and therefore considers all in need of sociological explanation. To substantiate this claim, he argues that all epistemic factors that are appealed to in explaining true or rational beliefs are really social. However, this argument aligns rational entities with social factors, and thus, undermines the ground of this division. Therefore, his prior complaint of the autonomy of knowledge would be invalidated. Hence, there is a conflict between Bloor’s objection to the asymmetrical explanation of scientific theories and his account of the social construction of epistemic reasons. In this paper, we reveal this concealed conflict and attempt to suggest ways to resolve it.

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Shahram Shahryari
Iranian Institute of Philosophy

Citations of this work

Shahryari on Bloor and the Strong Program.Finn Collin - 2022 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 11 (3):70-76.
Returning to Bloor and the Strong Program: A Brief Rejoinder to Shahryari.Finn Collin - 2022 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 11 (8):38-40.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and social imagery.David Bloor - 1976 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Knowledge and Social Imagery.David Bloor - 1979 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (2):195-199.
Relativism, rationalism and the sociology of knowledge.Barry Barnes & David Bloor - 1982 - In Martin Hollis & Steven Lukes (eds.), Rationality and relativism. Cambridge: MIT Press.
History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions.Imre Lakatos - 1970 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1970:91-136.

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