Authors
Sonia Sedivy
University of Toronto at Scarborough
Abstract
This paper argues that perception is a mode of engagement with individuals and their determinate properties. Perceptual content involves determinate properties in a way that relies on our conceptual capacities no less than on the properties. The “richness” of perceptual experience is explained as a distinctive individual and property involving content. This position is developed in three steps: (i) novel phenomenological description of lived experience; (ii) detailed reconstruction of Gareth Evans’ proposal that we are capable of genuinely singular thought that involves individuals under modes of presentation; (iii) re-consideration of the re-identification condition on conceptual contents.
Keywords philosophy of perception  conceptual content  Ludwig Wittgenstein  perceptual content  Gareth Evans
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.

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Citations of this work BETA

Nonconceptual Mental Content.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A Conceptualist Reply to Hanna’s Kantian Non-Conceptualism.Brady Bowman - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):417 - 446.
Aesthetic Properties, History and Perception.Sonia Sedivy - 2018 - British Journal of Aesthetics 58 (4):345-362.

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