Epistemic Responsibility and Perceptual Experience

In David Lauer, Christophe Laudou, Robin Celikates & Georg W. Bertram (eds.), Expérience Et Réflexivité: Perspectives au-Delà de L’Empirisme Et de L’Idéalisme. L'harmattan. pp. 14p (2011)
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Abstract

Any theory of perceptual experience should elucidate the way humans exploit it in activities proper to responsible agents, like justifying and revising their beliefs. In this paper I examine the hypothesis that this capacity requires the positing of a perceptual awareness involving a pre-doxastic actualization of concepts. I conclude that this hypothesis is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for empirical rationality. This leaves open the possibility to introduce a doxastic account, according to which the epistemic function of perception is fulfilled by perceptual beliefs. I develop this claim by showing that the doxastic account satisfies a series of intuitive requirements of justification and belief revision.

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Santiago Echeverri
National Autonomous University of Mexico

References found in this work

Does perception have a nonconceptual content?Christopher Peacocke - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (5):239-264.
Entitlement: Epistemic rights without epistemic duties?Fred Dretske - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):591-606.
Perception and belief.A. D. Smith - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):283-309.
Perception and Belief.A. D. Smith - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):283-309.
Nonconceptual Epicycles.Sonia Sedivy - 2006 - European Review of Philosophy 6:33-66.

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