Abstract

In the case of existential philosophy the division is understandable. The existentialist philosophers are clearly engaging in a program which has long been regarded as disreputable by the British. But in the case of phenomenology the divergence is an odd one, indeed. For what is phenomenology if not the "presuppositionless" reflection upon that which is "given" to consciousness? And what is "analysis" if not the unbiased and non speculative examination of experience? If phenomenology is actually "presuppositionless" and, further, if "analysis" is free of doctrinal commitment, how can they be either different or opposed? If there is or has been a difference between them, has it not been of necessity more accidental than essential, more a matter of choice of subject matter than of method or philosophical doctrine? The fact that some British philosophers are now beginning to dip their toes in the waters of French phenomenology, and even to make use of such phenomenological categories as "intentionality," suggests that this is the case. But to the extent that there have been unavowed "presuppositions" in phenomenology and implicit doctrines in "analysis," the differences have been genuine and substantival. They do differ, as a matter of fact, with respect both to what is "given" for analysis and what is involved in analytic reflection itself.