Locke's theory of reflection

British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (1):25 – 63 (2008)
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Abstract

Those concerned with Locke’s Essay have largely ignored his account of reflection. I present and defend an interpretation of Locke’s theory of reflection on which reflection is not a variety of introspection; rather, for Locke, we acquire ideas of our mental operations indirectly. Furthermore, reflection is involuntary and distinct from consciousness. The interpretation I present also explains reflection’s role in the acquisition of non-sensory ideas (e.g., ideas of pleasure, existence, succession, etc.). I situate this reading within the secondary literature on reflection and discuss its consequences for interpretations of Locke’s views on empiricism, knowledge, and personal identity.

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The state of the responsible research and innovation programme.George Inyila Ogoh & N. Ben Fairweather - 2019 - Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society 17 (2):145-166.

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References found in this work

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Richard Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Tractatus logico-philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1922 - Filosoficky Casopis 52:336-341.
The Bounds of Sense.P. F. Strawson - 1966 - Philosophy 42 (162):379-382.

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