Journal of Applied Philosophy 36 (1):137-154 (2019)

Authors
Joe Saunders
Durham University
Abstract
Kant views every human action as either entirely determined by natural necessity or entirely free. In viewing human action this way, it is unclear how he can account for degrees of responsibility. In this article, I consider three recent attempts to accommodate degrees of responsibility within Kant's framework, but argue that none of them are satisfying. In the end, I claim that transcendental idealism constrains Kant such that he cannot provide an adequate account of degrees of responsibility.
Keywords Kant  Freedom  Responsibility
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DOI 10.1111/japp.12293
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Kant-Bibliographie 2019.Margit Ruffing - 2021 - Kant-Studien 112 (4):623-660.

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