Kant and Degrees of Responsibility

Journal of Applied Philosophy 36 (1):137-154 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Kant views every human action as either entirely determined by natural necessity or entirely free. In viewing human action this way, it is unclear how he can account for degrees of responsibility. In this article, I consider three recent attempts to accommodate degrees of responsibility within Kant's framework, but argue that none of them are satisfying. In the end, I claim that transcendental idealism constrains Kant such that he cannot provide an adequate account of degrees of responsibility.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 79,971

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Empirical psychology, common sense, and Kant’s empirical markers for moral responsibility.Patrick Frierson - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (4):473-482.
Two approaches to moral responsibility : part two.Garrath Williams - 2004 - Richmond Journal of Philosophy 6:14-19.
Infima of d.r.e. degrees.Jiang Liu, Shenling Wang & Guohua Wu - 2010 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 49 (1):35-49.
The Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility.Scott Alan Davison - 1993 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
Responsibility and obligation: Some Kantian directions.Suzanne M. Uniacke - 2005 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (4):461 – 475.
On the very idea of degrees of truth.Timothy Cleveland - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):218 – 221.
Explaining (away) the epistemic condition on moral responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson - 2017 - In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford University Press. pp. 146–162.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-01-04

Downloads
70 (#182,278)

6 months
1 (#478,846)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Joe Saunders
Durham University

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references