Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):255-275 (2012)

Authors
Hanno Sauer
Utrecht University
Abstract
Moral judgements are based on automatic processes. Moral judgements are based on reason. In this paper, I argue that both of these claims are true, and show how they can be reconciled. Neither the automaticity of moral judgement nor the post hoc nature of conscious moral reasoning pose a threat to rationalist models of moral cognition. The relation moral reasoning bears to our moral judgements is not primarily mediated by episodes of conscious reasoning, but by the acquisition, formation and maintenance ? in short: education ? of our moral intuitions
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1080/13869795.2012.706822
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,130
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.

View all 98 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Why Moral Psychology is Disturbing.Regina Rini - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1439-1458.
Two Types of Debunking Arguments.Peter Königs - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):383-402.

View all 25 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Moral Intuitions, Moral Expertise and Moral Reasoning.Albert W. Musschenga - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (4):597-613.
The Wisdom of the Pack.Neil Levy - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):99 – 103.
Principle-Based Moral Judgement.Maike Albertzart - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):339-354.
The Epistemic Value of Intuitive Moral Judgements.Albert W. Musschenga - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):113-128.
Metaethics and Emotions Research: A Response to Prinz.Karen Jones - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):45-53.
Moral Reasoning: Hints and Allegations.Joseph M. Paxton & Joshua D. Greene - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):511-527.
On Moral Intuitions and Moral Heuristics: A Response.Cass R. Sunstein - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):565-570.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-07-31

Total views
151 ( #77,439 of 2,506,442 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #119,128 of 2,506,442 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes