Educated Intuitions. Automaticity and rationality in moral judgement

Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):255-275 (2012)
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Abstract

Moral judgements are based on automatic processes. Moral judgements are based on reason. In this paper, I argue that both of these claims are true, and show how they can be reconciled. Neither the automaticity of moral judgement nor the post hoc nature of conscious moral reasoning pose a threat to rationalist models of moral cognition. The relation moral reasoning bears to our moral judgements is not primarily mediated by episodes of conscious reasoning, but by the acquisition, formation and maintenance ? in short: education ? of our moral intuitions

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2012-07-31

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Hanno Sauer
Utrecht University

References found in this work

The extended mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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