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  1. Habitual Virtuous Action and Acting for Reasons.Lieke Joske Franci Asma - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-21.
    How can agents act virtuously out of habit? Virtuous actions are done for the right reasons, and acting for (right) reasons seems to involve deliberation. Yet, deliberation is absent if an agent’s action is habitual. That implies that the relationship between reasons and actions should be characterized in such a way that deliberation is unnecessary. In this paper, I examine three possible solutions: radical externalism, unconscious psychologism, and unconscious factualism. I argue that these proposals all fail to cast reasons in (...)
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  • A Developmental Theory for Aristotelian Practical Intelligence.Matt Ferkany - 2020 - Journal of Moral Education 49 (1):111-128.
    In Aristotelian virtue theories, phronesis is foundational to being good, but to date accounts of how this particularly important virtue can emerge are sketchy. This article plumbs recent thinking in Aristotelian virtue ethics and developmental theorizing to explore how far its emergence can be understood developmentally, i.e., in terms of the growth in ordinary conditions of underlying psychological capacities, dispositions, and the like. The purpose is not to explicate Aristotle, nor to assimilate Aristotelian ideas to cognitive developmental moral theorizing, but (...)
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  • Questioning Intuition Through Reflective Engagement.Christopher D. Schmidt - 2014 - Journal of Moral Education 43 (4):429-446.
    Current literature on ethics and moral development focuses on discussion concerning the impact of intuition on moral decision-making. Through the use of student journal reflections over the course of one semester, this study utilized a grounded theory approach in order to explore and understand participant levels of awareness and understanding of intuition in this regard. The findings suggest that reflective engagement enables these participants to become more aware of and therefore access and govern intuitions so that they can be more (...)
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  • Adam Smith’s Relevance for Contemporary Moral Cognition.Sarah Songhorian - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (5):662-683.
  • Expert Moral Intuition and Its Development: A Guide to the Debate.Michael Lacewing - 2015 - Topoi 34 (2):1-17.
    In this article, I provide a guide to some current thinking in empirical moral psychology on the nature of moral intuitions, focusing on the theories of Haidt and Narvaez. Their debate connects to philosophical discussions of virtue theory and the role of emotions in moral epistemology. After identifying difficulties attending the current debate around the relation between intuitions and reasoning, I focus on the question of the development of intuitions. I discuss how intuitions could be shaped into moral expertise, outlining (...)
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  • Reflection Without Regress.Cory Davia - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):995-1017.
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  • Sensitive to Reasons: Moral Intuition and the Dual Process Challenge to Ethics.Dario Cecchini - 2022 - Dissertation,
    This dissertation is a contribution to the field of empirically informed metaethics, which combines the rigorous conceptual clarity of traditional metaethics with a careful review of empirical evidence. More specifically, this work stands at the intersection of moral psychology, moral epistemology, and philosophy of action. The study comprises six chapters on three distinct (although related) topics. Each chapter is structured as an independent paper and addresses a specific open question in the literature. The first part concerns the psychological features and (...)
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  • Why Moral Psychology is Disturbing.Regina Rini - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1439-1458.
    Learning the psychological origins of our moral judgments can lead us to lose confidence in them. In this paper I explain why. I consider two explanations drawn from existing literature—regarding epistemic unreliability and automaticity—and argue that neither is fully adequate. I then propose a new explanation, according to which psychological research reveals the extent to which we are disturbingly disunified as moral agents.
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  • Using Insights From Applied Moral Psychology to Promote Ethical Behavior Among Engineering Students and Professional Engineers.Scott D. Gelfand - 2016 - Science and Engineering Ethics 22 (5):1513-1534.
    In this essay I discuss a novel engineering ethics class that has the potential to significantly decrease the likelihood that students will inadvertently or unintentionally act unethically in the future. This class is different from standard engineering ethics classes in that it focuses on the issue of why people act unethically and how students can avoid a variety of hurdles to ethical behavior. I do not deny that it is important for students to develop cogent moral reasoning and ethical decision-making (...)
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  • Can’T We All Disagree More Constructively? Moral Foundations, Moral Reasoning, and Political Disagreement.Hanno Sauer - 2015 - Neuroethics 8 (2):153-169.
    Can’t we all disagree more constructively? Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in political partisanship: the 2013 shutdown of the US government as well as an ever more divided political landscape in Europe illustrate that citizens and representatives of developed nations fundamentally disagree over virtually every significant issue of public policy, from immigration to health care, from the regulation of financial markets to climate change, from drug policies to medical procedures. The emerging field of political psychology brings the tools (...)
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  • Moral Disagreement and Non-Moral Ignorance.Nicholas Smyth - 2019 - Synthese 1 (2):1-20.
    The existence of deep and persistent moral disagreement poses a problem for a defender of moral knowledge. It seems particularly clear that a philosopher who thinks that we know a great many moral truths should explain how human populations have failed to converge on those truths. In this paper, I do two things. First, I show that the problem is more difficult than it is often taken to be, and second, I criticize a popular response, which involves claiming that many (...)
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  • Two Types of Debunking Arguments.Peter Königs - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):383-402.
    Debunking arguments are arguments that seek to undermine a belief or doctrine by exposing its causal origins. Two prominent proponents of such arguments are the utilitarians Joshua Greene and Peter Singer. They draw on evidence from moral psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary theory in an effort to show that there is something wrong with how deontological judgments are typically formed and with where our deontological intuitions come from. They offer debunking explanations of our emotion-driven deontological intuitions and dismiss complex deontological theories (...)
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  • De Dubbele Subjectiviteit van Het Geweten En Noodzaak van Toetsing van Gewetensbezwaren.Bert Musschenga - 2017 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 109 (3):329-345.
    The double subjectivity of conscience and the need to test conscientious objections -/- Abstract In spite of the collapse of the traditional objective concept of conscience and the subsequent subjectivation of conscience, conscientious objections are still often considered as a valid ground for exemption from legal and professional obligations. Conscientious objections are seen as more serious than ordinary moral objections. It is not evident why this is so. I argue, with Niklas Luhmann, that the function of conscience is to protect (...)
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  • Radical Rationalization Accommodates Rampant Irrationality.Joachim Lipski - 2018 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 25 (1):53-73.
    According to a classic position in analytic philosophy of mind, we must interpret agents as largely rational in order to be able to attribute intentional mental states to them. However, adopting this position requires clarifying in what way and by which criteria agents can still be irrational. In this paper I will offer one such criterion. More specifically, I argue that the kind of rationality methodologically required by intentional interpretation is to be specified in terms of psychological efficacy. Thereby, this (...)
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  • Reason and Emotion, Not Reason or Emotion in Moral Judgment.Leland F. Saunders - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations (3):1-16.
    One of the central questions in both metaethics and empirical moral psychology is whether moral judgments are the products of reason or emotions. This way of putting the question relies on an overly simplified view of reason and emotion as two fully independent cognitive faculties whose causal contributions to moral judgment can be cleanly separated. However, there is a significant body of evidence in the cognitive sciences that seriously undercuts this conception of reason and emotion, and supports the view that (...)
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  • Moral Learning, Rationality, and the Unreliability of Affect.Adam Gjesdal - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):460-473.
    ABSTRACTJames Woodward and John Allman [2007, 2008] and Peter Railton [2014, 2016] argue that our moral intuitions are products of sophisticated rational learning systems. I investigate the implications that this discovery has for intuition-based philosophical methodologies. Instead of vindicating the conservative use of intuitions in philosophy, I argue that what I call the rational learning strategy fails to show philosophers are justified in appealing to their moral intuitions in philosophical arguments without giving reasons why those intuitions are trustworthy. Despite the (...)
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  • Assessing Two Competing Approaches to the Psychology of Moral Judgments.Christian B. Miller - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):28-47.
    This paper brings together the social intuitionist view of the psychology of moral judgments developed by Jonathan Haidt, and the recent morphological rationalist position of Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons. I will end up suggesting that Horgan and Timmons have offered us a more plausible account of the psychology of moral judgment formation. But the view is not without its own difficulties. Indeed, one of them might prove to be quite serious, as it could support a form of skepticism about (...)
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  • Does Studying ‘Ethics’ Improve Engineering Students’ Meta-Moral Cognitive Skills?Reena Cheruvalath - 2019 - Science and Engineering Ethics 25 (2):583-596.
    This study examines the assumption that training in professional ethics is a predictor of the meta-moral cognitive ability of engineering students. The main purpose of the study was to check the difference in the meta-moral cognitive abilities between those students who studied a course on professional ethics, as part of the engineering curriculum, and those who did not undertake such a course. Using the survey method, the author conducted a pilot study amongst 243 engineering undergraduates. The meta-moral cognitive awareness inventory (...)
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  • Three Risks That Caution Against a Premature Implementation of Artificial Moral Agents for Practical and Economical Use.Christian Herzog - 2021 - Science and Engineering Ethics 27 (1):1-15.
    In the present article, I will advocate caution against developing artificial moral agents based on the notion that the utilization of preliminary forms of AMAs will potentially negatively feed back on the human social system and on human moral thought itself and its value—e.g., by reinforcing social inequalities, diminishing the breadth of employed ethical arguments and the value of character. While scientific investigations into AMAs pose no direct significant threat, I will argue against their premature utilization for practical and economical (...)
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  • Do Emotions Play an Essential Role in Moral Judgments?William H. B. McAuliffe - 2019 - Thinking and Reasoning 25 (2):207-230.
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  • A Developmental Theory for Aristotelian Practical Intelligence.Matt Ferkany - 2018 - Journal of Moral Education:1-18.
  • On the Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience and Dual-Process Theory.Peter Königs - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (2):195-209.
    According to the dual-process account of moral judgment, deontological and utilitarian judgments stem from two different cognitive systems. Deontological judgments are effortless, intuitive and emotion-driven, whereas utilitarian judgments are effortful, reasoned and dispassionate. The most notable evidence for dual-process theory comes from neuroimaging studies by Joshua Greene and colleagues. Greene has suggested that these empirical findings undermine deontology and support utilitarianism. It has been pointed out, however, that the most promising interpretation of his argument does not make use of the (...)
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  • Emotion’s Influence on Judgment-Formation: Breaking Down the Concept of Moral Intuition.Corey Steiner - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (2):228-243.
    ABSTRACTRecent discussions in the field of moral cognition suggest that the relationship between emotion and judgment-formation can be described in three separate ways: firstly, it narrows our atte...
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  • Intuitions, Rationalizations, and Justification: A Defense of Sentimental Rationalism.Frank Hindriks - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (2):195-216.
    People sometimes make moral judgments on the basis of brief emotional episodes. I follow the widely established practice of referring to such affective responses as intuitions (Haidt 2001, 2012; Bedke 2012, Copp 2012). Recently, a number of moral psychologists have argued that moral judgments are never more than emotion- or intuition-based pronouncements on what is right or wrong (Haidt 2001, Nichols 2004, Prinz 2007). A wide variety of empirical findings seem to support this claim. For example, some argue that arbitrary (...)
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  • Is Intuition Associated with Ethical Decision-Making?Jen-Sheng Liao, Yen-Yi Chung & Wen-Cheng Huang - 2018 - Hts Theological Studies 74 (1).
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