Philosophical Studies 154 (2):161-184 (2011)

Authors
Alexander Sarch
University of Surrey
Abstract
Internalism about a person's good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a person's well-being, that person must be capable of caring about that thing. I argue in this paper that internalism about a person's good should not be believed. Though many philosophers accept the view, Connie Rosati provides the most comprehensive case in favor of it. Her defense of the view consists mainly in offering five independent arguments to think that at least some form of internalism about one's good is true. But I argue that, on closer inspection, not one of these arguments succeeds. The problems don't end there, however. While Rosati offers good reasons to think that what she calls 'two-tier internalism' would be the best way to formulate the intuition behind internalism about one's good, I argue that two-tier internalism is actually false. In particular, the problem is that no substantive theory of well-being is consistent with two-tier internalism. Accordingly, there is reason to think that even the best version of internalism about one's good is in fact false. Thus, I conclude, the prospects for internalism about a person's good do not look promising
Keywords internalism  well-being  welfare  hedonism  desire satisfactionism  intrinsic value  motivation
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9533-0
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References found in this work BETA

Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
Natural Goodness.Philippa Foot - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Essays in Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Against Welfare Subjectivism.Eden Lin - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):354-377.
Why Should Welfare ‘Fit’?Dale Dorsey - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):685-24.
Pluralism About Well‐Being.Eden Lin - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):127-154.
Against Contextualism About Prudential Discourse.Guy Fletcher - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):699-720.

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