On the Possibility of Evidence for Intrinsic Value in Nature

Ethics and the Environment 18 (2):101-114 (2013)
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Ever since environmental ethics began to emerge as a philosophical discipline in the 1970s, one of the most common projects of environmental ethicists has been to formulate theories according to which nature (or some non-human natural entities) possesses intrinsic value. However, from time to time we have seen efforts to refute this project, the claim being that not only are the particular theories suggested flawed, but the very idea of intrinsic value in nature—at least in some allegedly important sense of “intrinsic value”—is in principle indefensible (e.g. Norton 1984; Thompson 1990; Regan 1992; Jamieson 1998). In previous work I have criticized several of these alleged refutations of the view that nature ..



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Lars Samuelsson
Umeå University

References found in this work

Environmental ethics and weak anthropocentrism.Bryan G. Norton - 1984 - Environmental Ethics 6 (2):131-148.
Animal Liberation is an Environmental Ethic.D. Jamieson - 1998 - Environmental Values 7 (1):41-57.
A Refutation of Environmental Ethics.Janna Thompson - 1990 - Environmental Ethics 12 (2):147-160.
Are Values in Nature Subjective or Objective? Rolston - 1982 - Environmental Ethics 4 (2):125-151.
Does Environmental Ethics Rest on a Mistake?Tom Regan - 1992 - The Monist 75 (2):161-182.

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