Abstract

As knowledge about the devastating consequences of human action on the environment grows, so does the urgency of finding answers to questions about how we ought to think about and act toward the natural world. Over the last twenty-five years, philosophers have attempted to develop an environmental ethic that can answer these questions. The most common articulations of environmental ethics set out to establish the value of nature beyond its mere usefulness to humans, a value referred to in the literature as intrinsic value. I critically examine two of the leading versions of environmental ethics which attempt to establish the intrinsic value of nature and find them wanting. I then turn to an alternative, ecofeminist approach to thinking about our obligations to the non-human world that is not preoccupied with establishing the intrinsic value of nature. I highlight some of the strengths and weaknesses of such an approach. In the end, I point in a new direction for answering questions about our relationship to the environment and for solving some of the most pressing global environmental problems; one that I call an ecofeminist contextualist approach to valuing nature