The Emergence of the Absolute by Genius in the Work of Art in Schelling's Early Philosophy of Art

Journal of Philosophical Investigations 17 (44):312-329 (2023)
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Abstract

Schelling's goal is to find a total consciousness for human; therefore, in the philosophy of nature, he tries to reach from the real to the ideal. On the other hand, the conscious spirit is a product of human subjectivity, so, an unconscious spirit manages things. Therefore, Schelling's transition from natural philosophy to the system of transcendental idealism occurs. Reaching this level of consciousness is possible when [I] goes through different stages. The first stage is sensation, then reflection and after that comes praxis. But since the will of the subject of and the will of nature are the same, and ethics is in the realm of practical reason, then the subject of action does not have free will. Therefore, there is a gap between theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy that Schelling must somehow fill. He solves this problem with the free and creative will of an artist, a will that acts not out of necessity but freely. Schelling reaches the absolute from the identity of natural philosophy and transcendental idealism. The absolute is the result of identity of the real and the ideal. It is crystal clear that expounding how to objectify the absolute leads to a better comprehension of Schelling's philosophical system. In this article, it is investigated that among theoretical wisdom, practical wisdom and art, which one Schelling deems the most functional mechanism to objectify the absolute, and what are the roles of genius and the beauty through this path.

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