Mind 126 (503):817-840 (2016)

Lea Salje
University of Leeds
This paper brings into focus the idea that just as no third-personal way of thinking could capture the self-consciousness of first-person thought, no first- or third- personal way of thinking could capture the especially intimate way we have of relating to each other canonically expressed with our uses of ‘you’. It proposes, motivates and defends the view that second-person speech is canonically expressive of a distinctive way we have of thinking of each other, under a concept that refers de jure to its addressee and whose availability depends on standing in a relation of interpersonal self-consciousness with another.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzw018
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
Self-Consciousness.Sebastian Rödl - 2007 - Harvard University Press.
De Re Senses.John Mcdowell - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):283-294.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemology Personalized.Matthew A. Benton - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):813-834.
First-Person Thought.Daniel Morgan & Léa Salje - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):148-163.
The Second Person Perspective.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1693-1711.

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