Conceivability, inconceivability and cartesian modal epistemology

Synthese 195 (11):4785-4816 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In various arguments, Descartes relies on the principles that conceivability implies possibility and that inconceivability implies impossibility. Those principles are in tension with another Cartesian view about the source of modality, i.e. the doctrine of the free creation of eternal truths. In this paper, I develop a ‘two-modality’ interpretation of the doctrine of eternal truths which resolves the tension and I discuss how the resulting modal epistemology can still be relevant for the contemporary discussion.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 102,074

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-09-03

Downloads
136 (#164,836)

6 months
8 (#629,124)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Pierre Saint-Germier
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Citations of this work

Bergson’s Arguments for Matter as Images in Matter and Memory .Tatsuya Murayama - 2024 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 106 (4):858-883.

Add more citations

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.

View all 50 references / Add more references