The knot of the world, subjectivity and ontology of the first person

Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 10:194-223 (2009)
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Abstract

This paper looks for to show the relevance of the perspective of the first person through a phenomenological approach. As opposed to the refusal of the different tendencies from the ana­lytical philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences and neuroscience to consider the reality of the mental states like subjective phenomena, outline a revi­sion of the question with the purpose of indicating to the relation between the subjective experience and a ontol­ogy of the first person

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