The Theory of Objects as Commonsense

Grazer Philosophische Studien 9 (1):1-22 (1979)
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Abstract

Meinong's theory of objects offers an alternative to entrenched logical theory which is nonreductionist, antiverificationist and commonsense. A beginning is made on proving that the theory is a commonsense one. This involves characterising refined commonsense and commonsense philosophy, upon sharpening the theses of the theory of objects, and indicating how these theses can, and do, fit into a commonsense position.

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Richard (Routley) Sylvan: Writings on Logic and Metaphysics.Dominic Hyde - 2001 - History and Philosophy of Logic 22 (4):181-205.
Introduction.Filippo Casati, Chris Mortensen & Graham Priest - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Logic 15 (2):28-40.

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