Sensation, perception and immediacy: Mead and Merleau-ponty

Southwest Philosophy Review 6 (1):105-111 (1990)
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Abstract

A focus on the relation between sensation and the perceptual object in the philosophies of G H Mead and Maurice Merleau-Ponty points toward their shared views of perception as non-reductionistic and holistic, as inextricably tied to the active role of the sensible body, and as involving a new understanding of the nature of immediacy within experience. This essay explores these shared views.

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Patrick Bourgeois
Loyola University, New Orleans

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