Abstract

In the article “Why are we our brain: enactivism put into question” (this volume), Pereira and collaborators raise a battery of criticisms of enactivism, which is a family of approaches in the cognitive sciences that gives centrality to the body and to the autonomous action of organisms in explanations of their cognitive processes. The authors’ attacks target some central concepts of the enactivist proposal, such as practical knowledge, embodiment (or corporeity) and sensory-motor regularities. I argue that the criticisms by Pereira et al. do not proceed for different reasons: some assume what they want to prove, others give excessive weight to intuitions about fictional scenarios and, finally, others attack scarecrows that do not represent the enactivist positions. None of the points I raise in defense of enactivism are new, but I consider it important to make them explicit in order to make the debate on the philosophy of cognitive sciences clearer.