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On games under expected utility with rank dependent probabilities
Theory and Decision 40 (1):1-27 (1996)
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Citations of this work
Pure-strategy Equilibria with Non-expected Utility Players.Ho-Chyuan Chen & William S. Neilson - 1999 - Theory and Decision 46 (2):201-212.
References found in this work
Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity.David Schmeidler - 1989 - Econometrica 57:571-589.
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk.D. Kahneman & A. Tversky - 1979 - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society:263--291.
Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games.Reinhard Selten - 1975 - International Journal of Game Theory 4:25-55.
Separating marginal utility and probabilistic risk aversion.Peter Wakker - 1994 - Theory and Decision 36 (1):1-44.
Oddness of the Number of Equilibrium Points: A New Proof.John Harsanyi - 1973 - International Journal of Game Theory 2:235-250.
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