Humean Intentions

American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (2):157-178 (1998)
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Abstract

Many hold that the differences between intentions and desires are so significant that, not only can we not identify intentions with desires simpliciter, but that intentions are irreducible to any subclass of desires. My main aim is to explain why we should reject the irreducibility thesis in both forms, thereby defending the Humean view of action explanation.

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Michael Ridge
University of Edinburgh

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