Toward an Ecological Ethic
Dissertation, Vanderbilt University (
1991)
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Abstract
This dissertation is an attempt to derive an environmental ethic from an understanding of the implications of ecological science, evolution, and a view of epistemology. In this systematic endeavor, a doctrine of internal relations emerges that overcomes the ontological and axiological dualisms that have inhibited the development of an environmental ethic and establishes the grounds for a theory of values that affirms both their relationality and objectivity. In this view, everything is of value, not only as an end in itself, but also as a means to further ends. The scope of value relations, and hence the boundaries of our moral community, is expanded to include the whole realm of creation in a way that reflects the emergence of all beings from a common process of evolution and the constitution of the human being by both a human and natural world. One of the claims of this thesis is that it is possible to affirm an ethic that is sympathetic to our natural environment without ignoring the differences between humans and the rest of the world. By constructing an ethic that is both inclusive as well as hierarchical, it is possible to establish a view that not only eschews the biocentric egalitarianism that is unable to resolve conflicts between the needs of various beings, but also restricts the concept of rights to humans while avoiding the charge of "speciesism." The holistic perspective established in this dissertation transcends the individualism inherent in the deontological and utilitarian traditions without ignoring the legitimate concerns of these approaches. By rejecting the atomistic reductionism assumed by these theories, a holistic alternative is developed that embraces, yet extends beyond, what is individual and sentient, to include the larger and more fundamental events of whole species and ecosystems. It is essential to an ecological ethic that we recognize the duty and the capacity to consider the well-being of these collectivities for the sake of their individual parts or members and also for their own sakes