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Omitting the second person in social understanding
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):140-141 (1996)
Abstract
Barresi & Moore do not consider information about intentional relations available within emotional engagement with others and do not see that others are perceived in the second as well as the third person. Recognising second person information forces recognition of similarities and connections not otherwise available. A developmental framework built on the assumption of the complete separateness of self and other is inevitably flawed.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Toward a second-person neuroscience.Bert Timmermans, Vasudevi Reddy, Alan Costall, Gary Bente, Tobias Schlicht, Kai Vogeley & Leonhard Schilbach - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):393-414.
Enactive intersubjectivity: Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation.Thomas Fuchs & Hanne De Jaegher - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):465-486.
A new look at joint attention and common knowledge.Barbora Siposova & Malinda Carpenter - 2019 - Cognition 189 (C):260-274.
Joint attention without recursive mindreading: On the role of second-person engagement.Felipe León - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):550-580.
On being the object of attention: Implications for self-other consciousness.Vasudevi Reddy - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (9):397-402.
References found in this work
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press. Edited by Margaret A. Boden.
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