Abstract

In his 1939 essay, “Some Questions on Dewey’s Aesthetics,” Stephen Pepper gave the following assessment of Dewey’s Art as Experience of 1934: “We are deprived of a pragmatic theory of ugliness” because Dewey “was reverting to Hegelianism in his later years.” By ‘Hegelianism’ Pepper meant the Second Oxford Hegelianism of Bernard Bosanquet. Similarly, Dale Jacquette wrote in 1984 that “nothing is ugly” in Bosanquet’s Three Lectures on Aesthetics, a work that Jacquette sees as bearing the influence of Hegel. But neither critic has taken into account the following: Hegel and Bosanquet both employ an aesthetic-technical as well as a conventional concept of ‘beauty.’ In order to call an artwork ‘aesthetically excellent,’ both thinkers refer to artwork in an aesthetic-technical sense as ‘beautiful artwork.’ However, artworks that are beautiful in the aesthetic-technical sense can be ugly in the conventional sense. In order to evaluate the potential of a Hegelian aesthetic of the ugly, a distinction must be made between the aesthetic-technical and the conventional use of the terms ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’ in both Hegel and Bosanquet. And this the early Bosanquet — i.e., the Bosanquet of the 1892 A History of Aesthetic — did not see in Hegel.