Can One Be Two?: A Synopsis of the Twinning and Personhood Debate

Monash Bioethics Review 31 (2):37-59 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It has been argued that the possibility of monozygotic twinning disproves the conservative position on foetal personhood that defines the foetus as a person from conception. This article will canvass arguments for and against this proposition, in order to arrive at a conclusion as to the relative strength of this finding.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,774

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-06-30

Downloads
12 (#317,170)

6 months
6 (#1,472,471)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Sixteen days.Barry Smith & Berit Brogaard - 2003 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 28 (1):45 – 78.
Substance Ontology Cannot Determine the Moral Status of Embryos.J. Morris - 2012 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (4):331-350.
Embryos, Souls, and the Fourth Dimension.David W. Shoemaker - 2005 - Social Theory and Practice 31 (1):51-75.

View all 18 references / Add more references