Abstract

Debates are taking place on the opportunity or not of establishing links between ethics and neuroscience. At first glance, this proposition jeopardizes a traditional conception of ethics that distinguishes it clearly from the empirical sciences. Taking this step seems to involve a deterministic and reductionist view of ethics. We argue in this article that, contrary to the views of some critics, neuroscience can be useful for ethics. Five arguments against integrating neurosciences in ethics are presented (determinism, naturalistic fallacy, dualism, reductionism and the hegemony of objectivity). We claim that these arguments do not imply the impossibility of the integration of neuroscience in ethics but constitute rather important qualifications that must be taken into account. Our next step is to present an emergentist and interdisciplinary neurophilosophical approach, which we distinguish from the neurophilosophy of ethics proposed by Patricia Churchland. We go on with the presentation of a research sector in neurosciences (neuroscience of moral reasoning and moral emotions) that illustrates the interest of the proposed neurophilosophical approach. The article concludes with critical remarks.