Abstract

The purpose of this study is twofold. First, we show how Heidegger's early philosophy effectively overcomes certain conceptual determinations within the standpoint of metaphysics, namely, the subject/object distinction, the problem of reflection, and the notion of being as presence. Secondly, we argue that the project of metaphysics is to provide a conceptual grounding which legitimates the discourse of metaphysics, and that Heidegger's project works within this same framework. Because the conceptual determinations differ between different philosophical systems a sharp distinction is made between the methodological framework and the conceptual determinations to which it gives rise. Our contention is that this methodological framework is characteristic of both Heidegger and metaphysics. Because Heidegger still operates within this framework, his project remains within the discourse of metaphysics--a discourse he sought to overcome. We then argue that this method determines the types of results which must obtain in the discourse of philosophy. ;We first provide a critical interpretation of the epistemological model of reflection to which Heidegger's early philosophy is a response. We then critically explicate the manner in which Heidegger ontologizes the epistemological project of reflective philosophy and how his ontology provides a radical point of departure from the epistemological standpoint of reflection while remaining within the same general methodological framework. This is accomplished through a critical discussion of the roles of intentionality, being-in-the-world, and temporality. We then argue, however, that rather than overcoming metaphysics, Heidegger's method betrays a definite continuity with the tradition of reflective philosophy and with metaphysics in general. This critique argues that insofar as Heidegger's method is a continuation of metaphysics , his project is confined within the very limits or horizons he seeks to overcome. Finally, through a critical appropriation of Deleuze, we argue for an alternative model in which the conditions of possibility for philosophy are no longer singular and hierarchically grounding, but multiple and constituted on a plane of consistency. In conclusion, we argue for a different type of condition of possibility