In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 177--200 (2007)
Abstract(revisions posted 12/5/2006) to appear in Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, ed. by Sanford Goldberg (to be published by Oxford in 2006 or 2007) Michael McKinsey formulated an argument that raises a puzzle about the relation between externalism about content and our introspective awareness of content. The puzzle goes like this: it seems like I can know the contents of my thoughts by introspection alone; but philosophical reflection tells me that the contents of those thoughts are externalist, and so I couldn
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
Citations of this work
Hyper-Reliability and Apriority.James Pryor - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):327–344.
Epistemological Disjunctivism’s Genuine Access Problem.Tim Kraft - 2015 - Theoria 81 (4):311-332.
Similar books and articles
Privileged Self-Knowledge and Externalism Are Compatible.Ted A. Warfield - 1992 - Analysis 52 (4):232-37.
Externalism, Internalism, and Knowledge of Content.Keith Butler - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):773-800.
McKinsey Paradoxes, Radical Skepticism, and the Transmission of Knowledge Across Known Entailments.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - Synthese 130 (2):279-302.
Semantic Internalism and Externalism.Katalin Farkas - 2006 - In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 323.
Tienson’s Challenge to Content Externalism.Brie Gertler - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):60-65.