What's Wrong with McKinsey-style Reasoning?

In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 177--200 (2007)
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Abstract

(revisions posted 12/5/2006) to appear in Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, ed. by Sanford Goldberg (to be published by Oxford in 2006 or 2007) Michael McKinsey formulated an argument that raises a puzzle about the relation between externalism about content and our introspective awareness of content. The puzzle goes like this: it seems like I can know the contents of my thoughts by introspection alone; but philosophical reflection tells me that the contents of those thoughts are externalist, and so I couldn

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James Pryor
New York University

Citations of this work

Externalism about mental content.Joe Lau - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Hyper-reliability and apriority.James Pryor - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):327–344.
Resisting the epistemic argument for compatibilism.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1743-1767.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Reason, truth, and history.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.

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