Hyper-reliability and apriority

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):327–344 (2006)
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Abstract

I argue that beliefs that are true whenever held-like I exist, I am thinking about myself, and (in an object-dependent framework) Jack = Jack-needn't on that account be a priori. It does however seem possible to remove the existential commitment from the last example, to get a belief that is knowable a priori. I discuss some difficulties concerning how to do that

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James Pryor
New York University

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In Defense of Pure Reason.Laurence BonJour - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
Content preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.

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