All Reasons Are Moral

Abstract

Morality doesn't always require our best. Prudent acts and heroic sacrifices are optional, not obligatory. To explain this, some philosophers claim that reasons of self-interest must have a special "non-moral" significance. A better explanation, I argue, is that we have prerogatives based in rights.

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Author's Profile

Daniel Muñoz
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Consequentialists Must Kill.Christopher Howard - 2021 - Ethics 131 (4):727-753.
There are No Easy Counterexamples to Legal Anti-positivism.Emad H. Atiq - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17 (1).
Possessing Love’s Reasons: Or Why a Rationalist Lover Can Have a Normal Romantic Life.Ting Cho Lau - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (13):382-405.

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References found in this work

Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Limits of Morality.Shelly Kagan - 1989 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Moral saints.Susan Wolf - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (8):419-439.
The Realm of Rights.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1990 - Harvard University Press.

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