All Reasons Are Moral

Abstract

Morality doesn't always require our best. Prudent acts and heroic sacrifices are optional, not obligatory. To explain this, some philosophers claim that reasons of self-interest must have a special "non-moral" significance. A better explanation, I argue, is that we have prerogatives based in rights.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

My notes

Similar books and articles

Chapter 5: Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and Overridingness.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscript
Are moral reasons morally overriding?Douglas Portmore - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):369–88.
The Weight of Moral Reasons.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (Ed. Mark Timmons) 3:35-58.
What We Owe to Ourselves: Essays on Rights and Supererogation.Daniel Muñoz - 2019 - Dissertation, MIT
Supererogation and the Limits of Reasons.Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt & Daniel Munoz - 2023 - In David Heyd, Handbook of Supererogation. Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 165-180.
From rights to prerogatives.Daniel Muñoz - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):608-623.
The case for a duty to research: not yet proven.Iain Brassington - 2014 - Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (5):329-330.
A Defense of Agent-Centered Prerogatives.Michael Anthony Ialacci - 1995 - Dissertation, Brown University
Moral Worth.Nomy Arpaly - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (5):223.
Does morality demand our very best? On moral prescriptions and the line of duty.Michael Ferry - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):573-589.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-08-18

Downloads
188 (#138,989)

6 months
5 (#1,044,000)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Daniel Muñoz
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

There are No Easy Counterexamples to Legal Anti-positivism.Emad H. Atiq - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17 (1).
Consequentialists Must Kill.Christopher Howard - 2021 - Ethics 131 (4):727-753.
Possessing Love’s Reasons: Or Why a Rationalist Lover Can Have a Normal Romantic Life.Ting Cho Lau - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (13):382-405.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The limits of morality.Shelly Kagan - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Moral saints.Susan Wolf - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (8):419-439.
The Realm of Rights.Judith Thomson - 1990 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 36 references / Add more references