Warrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper Function

New York, US: Oxford University Press USA (1993)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Plantinga examines the nature of epistemic warrant; whatever it is that when added to true belief yields knowledge. This volume surveys current contributions to the debate and paves the way for his owm positive proposal in Warrant and Proper Function.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,709

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Warrant and proper function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Proper Function and the Conditions for Warrant.Mark J. Boone - 2012 - Philosophia Christi 14 (2):373-386.
Warrant and analysis.Joel Pust - 2000 - Analysis 60 (1):51–57.
Some Remarks on Bonjour on Warrant, Proper Function, and Defeasibility.Colin P. Ruloff - 2000 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 4 (2):215-228.
Plantinga on warrant.Richard Swinburne - 2001 - Religious Studies 37 (2):203-214.
Reliabilism, proper function, and serendipitous malfunction.Adrian Bardon - 2006 - Philosophical Investigations 30 (1):45–64.
Plantinga-Warrant and Reliabilist Warrant.Jerome Gellman - 2014 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 18 (2):291.
Warrant is unique.Andrew M. Bailey - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):297-304.
Accidentally true belief and warrant.Andrew Chignell - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):445 - 458.
The Apologetical Implications of Alvin Plantinga's Epistemology.K. Scott Oliphint - 1994 - Dissertation, Westminster Theological Seminary
Warranted Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2000 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology. [REVIEW]Ernest Sosa - 1996 - In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 253-270.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
216 (#92,773)

6 months
18 (#140,036)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Alvin Plantinga
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

Why Credences Are Not Beliefs.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):360-370.
The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.
What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Guy Kahane - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):103-125.

View all 198 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references