Philosophical Forum 24 (1-3):188-232 (1993)

Authors
Adrian M. S. Piper
APRA Foundation, Berlin
Abstract
The purpose of this discussion is twofold. First, I want to shed some light on Kant's concept of personhood as rational agency, by situating it in the context of the first Critique's conception of the self as defined by its rational dispositions. I hope to suggest that this concept of personhood cannot be simply grafted onto an essentially Humean conception of the self that is inherently inimical to it, as I believe Rawls, Gewirth, and others have tried to do. Instead I will try to show how deeply embedded this concept of personhood is in Kant's conception of the self as rationally unified consciousness. Second, I want to deploy this embedded concept of personhood as the basis for an analysis of the phenomenon of xenophobia.
Keywords Xenophobia  Kant  Rationalism
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Kant’s Universalism Versus Pragmatism.Hemmo Laiho - 2019 - In Krzysztof Skowroński & Sami Pihlström (eds.), Pragmatist Kant—Pragmatism, Kant, and Kantianism in the Twenty-first Century. Helsinki, Finland: pp. 60-75.

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