How Can One Person Represent Another?

&
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 34 (1):187-224 (1960)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1093/aristoteliansupp/34.1.187

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,423

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

How Can One Person Represent Another?A. Griffiths & Richard Wollheim - 1960 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 34:187-224.
Picturing Unreality.M. R. Haight - 1972 - Analysis 32 (3):65 - 67.
Gordon W. Allport’s Concept of the Human Person: On a Possible Dialogue between Philosophy and Psychology.Omi Jastrzebski - 2011 - The Pluralist 6 (1):71-86.
Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2013 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
The first person and third person views (part I).David J. Chalmers - manuscript
Merging second-person and first-person neuroscience.Matthew R. Longo & Manos Tsakiris - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):429-430.
The Spectator in the Picture.Robert Hopkins - 2001 - In Rob van Gerwen (ed.), Richard Wollheim on the Art of Painting: Art as Representation and Expression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 215-231.
The Notion of Person: a Reappraisal from the Side of Human Rights.Barbara de Mori - unknown
Zur theoretischen Auffassung der Person überhaupt Person und Akt; die psychophysische Indifferenz der Person und des konkreten Aktes. Wesenhafte Zentralitätsstufen innerhalb der Person: Person und Welt.Max Scheler - 1916 - Jahrbuch für Philosophie Und Phänomenologische Forschung 2:266.
Reasons and Oughts.David Barnet Conter - 1983 - Dissertation, Mcgill University (Canada)
Human Rights and Concept of Person.Barbara de Mori - 2001 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):159-169.
What Minds Can Do: Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World.Pierre Jacob - 1997 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Zur theoretischen Auffassung der Person überhaupt Person und Akt; die psychophysische Indifferenz der Person und des konkreten Aktes. Wesenhafte Zentralitätstufen innerhalb der Person: Das Sein der Person ist nie Gegenstand. Die psychophysische Indifferenz der Person und ihrer Akte. Ihr Verhaältnis zum "Bewusstsein". [REVIEW]Max Scheler - 1916 - Jahrbuch für Philosophie Und Phänomenologische Forschung 2:259.
Do Experiences Represent?Michael Jacovides - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):87-103.
The self-concordance model of healthy goal striving: When personal goals correctly represent the person.Kennon M. Sheldon - 2002 - In Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan (eds.), Handbook of Self-Determination Research. University of Rochester Press. pp. 65--86.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-05-29

Downloads
132 (#135,839)

6 months
16 (#149,885)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

On Representing.Andrew Rehfeld - 2018 - Journal of Political Philosophy 26 (2):216-239.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references