I—Richard Moran: Testimony, Illocution and the Second Person

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):115-135 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The notion of ‘bipolar’ or ‘second‐personal’ normativity is often illustrated by such situations as that of one person addressing a complaint to another, or asserting some right, or claiming some authority. This paper argues that the presence of speech acts of various kinds in the development of the idea of the ‘second‐personal’ is not accidental. Through development of a notion of ‘illocutionary authority’ I seek to show a role for the ‘second‐personal’ in ordinary testimony, despite Darwall's argument that the notion of the ‘second‐personal’ marks a divide between practical and theoretical reason.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,998

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-06-09

Downloads
241 (#84,068)

6 months
38 (#98,529)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Richard Moran
Harvard University

Citations of this work

Assertion and Testimony.Edward Hinchman - 2020 - In Goldberg Sanford (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Assertion. Oxford University Press.
Groups with Minds of Their Own Making.Leo Townsend - 2019 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (1):129-151.
Two Second‐Personal Conceptions of the Dignity of Persons.Ariel Zylberman - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):921-943.
Trust, Belief, and the Second-Personal.Thomas W. Simpson - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):447-459.
Second person thought.Jane Heal - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):317-331.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

How to do things with words.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John Rogers Searle - 1969 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Practical reason and norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - London: Hutchinson.
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.William P. Alston - 1970 - Philosophical Quarterly 20 (79):172-179.

View all 33 references / Add more references