I—Richard Moran: Testimony, Illocution and the Second Person

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):115-135 (2013)
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The notion of ‘bipolar’ or ‘second‐personal’ normativity is often illustrated by such situations as that of one person addressing a complaint to another, or asserting some right, or claiming some authority. This paper argues that the presence of speech acts of various kinds in the development of the idea of the ‘second‐personal’ is not accidental. Through development of a notion of ‘illocutionary authority’ I seek to show a role for the ‘second‐personal’ in ordinary testimony, despite Darwall's argument that the notion of the ‘second‐personal’ marks a divide between practical and theoretical reason.



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Citations of this work

Assertion and Testimony.Edward Hinchman - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Trust, Belief, and the Second-Personal.Thomas W. Simpson - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):447-459.
Groups with Minds of Their Own Making.Leo Townsend - 2020 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (1):129-151.
Second person thought.Jane Heal - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):317-331.
Two Second‐Personal Conceptions of the Dignity of Persons.Ariel Zylberman - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):921-943.

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