Abstract
According to so-called transformative theories of rationality, human nature is of a fundamentally different kind than the nature of non-human animals, because it is transformed by the possession of rational capacities. This is assumed tobe reflected in the fact that human nature and non-human nature require two fundamentally different forms of explanation: reason-based explanations on the one hand, explanations with reference to natural laws on the other. There is no continuity between these two forms of explanation, i.e. a transition from one to the other is not intelligible. In this paper, I will draw on Hegel to sketch a counter-position to this kind of “continuity skepticism” (Dorit Bar-On, 2013). The central thesis is that Hegel’s project in his anthropology is to make the transition from one order of explanation to another intelligible by outlining an intermediate realm in which the phenomena under investigation are no longer entirely outside, and not yet entirely inside, the rational order of explanation.