- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Adopting the intentional stance toward natural and artificial agents
Philosophical Psychology 33 (3):369-395 (2019)
Abstract
ABSTRACTIn our daily lives, we need to predict and understand others’ behavior in order to navigate through our social environment. Predictions concerning other humans’ behavior usually refer to th...My notes
Similar books and articles
Do We Adopt the Intentional Stance Toward Humanoid Robots?Serena Marchesi, Davide Ghiglino, Francesca Ciardo, Jairo Perez-Osorio, Ebru Baykara & Agnieszka Wykowska - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
Cognitive automata and the law: Electronic contracting and the intentionality of software agents. [REVIEW]Giovanni Sartor - 2009 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 17 (4):253-290.
Reading mother nature's mind.Ruth G. Millikan - 2000 - In Don Ross, Andrew Brook & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.
A Value-Sensitive Design Approach to Intelligent Agents.Steven Umbrello & Angelo Frank De Bellis - 2018 - In Yampolskiy Roman (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Safety and Security. CRC Press. pp. 395-410.
Precis of the intentional stance.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):495-505.
Two Improvements to the Intentional Stance Theory: Hutto and Satne on Naturalizing Content.Marc Slors - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):579-591.
Can Artificial Systems Be Part of a Collective Action?Anna Strasser - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag. pp. 205-218.
Philosophical Signposts for Artificial Moral Agent Frameworks.Robert James M. Boyles - 2017 - Suri 6 (2):92–109.
Causalism and Intentional Omission.Joshua Shepherd - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):15-26.
Our understanding of other minds: theory of mind and the intentional stance.Kristin Andrews - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):12-24.
The influence of epistemology on the design of artificial agents.Mark Lee & Nick Lacey - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (3):367-395.
Order, Order Everywhere, and Only an Agent to Think: The Cognitive Compulsion to Infer Intentional Agents.Frank C. Keil & George E. Newman - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (2):117-139.
Cognition, natural selection and the intentional stance.Daisie Radner & Michael Radner - 1995 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (2):109-19.
Analytics
Added to PP
2019-12-10
Downloads
25 (#629,577)
6 months
14 (#175,970)
2019-12-10
Downloads
25 (#629,577)
6 months
14 (#175,970)
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Can Artificial Intelligence Make Art?Elzė Sigutė Mikalonytė & Markus Kneer - 2022 - ACM Transactions on Human-Robot Interactions.
Can a Robot Lie? Exploring the Folk Concept of Lying as Applied to Artificial Agents.Markus Https://Orcidorg Kneer - 2021 - Cognitive Science 45 (10):e13032.
Guilty Artificial Minds: Folk Attributions of Mens Rea and Culpability to Artificially Intelligent Agents.Michael T. Stuart & Markus Kneer - 2021 - Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 5 (CSCW2).
Empathic responses and moral status for social robots: an argument in favor of robot patienthood based on K. E. Løgstrup.Simon N. Balle - 2022 - AI and Society 37 (2):535-548.
The Ethics of Terminology: Can We Use Human Terms to Describe AI?Ophelia Deroy - 2023 - Topoi 42 (3):881-889.
References found in this work
Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception.H. Wimmer - 1983 - Cognition 13 (1):103-128.
Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition.Michael Tomasello, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya Behne & Henrike Moll - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):675-691.
Pretense and representation: The origins of "theory of mind.".Alan M. Leslie - 1987 - Psychological Review 94 (4):412-426.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-64dd777598-cl5t5 uwo